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Statements about the US-India Nuclear Deal at the 2008 NPT PrepCom
NGO Statement at 2008 NPT PrepCom
The following statement was delivered by John Loretz of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War on 29 April 2008. It is based on an international letter sent on 7 January 2008 to governments on the NSG and the IAEA Board of Governors.
Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India: A Nonproliferation Disaster
Convenors: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association; Philip White, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
Speaker: John Loretz, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Ladies and Gentleman:
As we mark the 40th anniversary of the opening for signature of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), global system for controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons is under severe stress. This presentation addresses a fundamental challenge to the treaty: the July 2005 proposal to carve-out a country-specific loophole in global nonproliferation norms and standards to allow a handful of nuclear supplier states to engage in nuclear cooperation with India, which is one of the few remaining NPT hold-out states.
We believe that each NPT state party has a role and responsibility to actively help ensure that any proposed nuclear cooperation with India, or with any other country outside the NPT, should be fully consistent with the treaty and all NPT Review Conference decisions, as well as United Nations Security Council resolution, the established practices of the IAEA safeguards system, and international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agreements, principles, and norms.
This presentation represents the views of more than 130 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries, including the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It is based on a letter dated 7 January 2008 that was sent by these organizations and individuals to over 60 governments.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors may soon be asked to consider a new "India-specific" safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional "civilianÅh reactors. Shortly thereafter, the members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be asked to take a position on the Bush administration's proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. This would open the door for the United States and others to engage in nuclear trade with India for the first time since India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United States in violation of bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements.
Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the proposed arrangement fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms. Consequently, the proposed arrangement would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament.
We urge your government and this meeting of NPT states parties has a responsibility to consider the full implications of the proposed agreement and to play an active role to help ensure that this controversial proposal does not:
- further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material;
- in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion of India's nuclear arsenal; or
- otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of the NPT.
Please consider the following:
1) India is seeking "India-specific" safeguards over the additional facilities it has declared "civilian". Indian officials insist that the continuation of these safeguards depends upon the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers. India may also assert that it has the option to remove certain "indigenous" reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are interrupted, even if that is because it has resumed nuclear testing. Such interpretations would be unprecedented and should be rejected whether they might be included in the actual safeguards agreement or accompanying statements.
As part of the final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by a subset of the NPT states parties - the 45-nation NSG - to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this important element of the NPT bargain.
It should also be noted that the several countries that are parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga have made further commitments not to provide any source or special fissionable material to any NPT non-nuclear-weapon state unless the recipient state is under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
We urge your government to actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.
2) India pledged in July 2005 to conclude an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional "civilian" reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.
3) The United States has put forward a draft NSG guideline that would allow NSG states to continue providing India with nuclear supplies even if New Delhi breaks its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Indian officials say they want changes to NSG guidelines that do not impinge upon their ability to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. proposal on India at the NSG would, in the case of a resumption of nuclear testing by India, make the suspension of nuclear trade optional for NSG members. Such an approach would undercut the international norm against nuclear testing and make a mockery of NSG guidelines. Nuclear supplier states should be immediately terminated if India resumes nuclear testing for any reason.
4) India is seeking exemptions from NSG guidelines and IAEA supply guarantees that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing. The U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement includes political commitments to support an Indian strategic fuel reserve and an "India-specific" fuel supply arrangement. If nuclear supplier states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements.
5) India is seeking and the United States has proposed an NSG guideline that would open the way for other nuclear suppliers to transfer sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology to India even though IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such technology from being replicated and used in its weapons program. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Foreign-assisted enrichment and reprocessing, even if ostensibly confined to the civilian program, could help India in its military programs because Indian technicians could adapt civilian assistance to the weapons program through reverse engineering. So long as India maintains an unsafeguarded weapons program, no such technologies should be transferred to India.
6) Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, foreign fuel supplies would allow India not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials. This would not only contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT, but it would also foster further nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. India's stated support for a global, verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty is welcome, but insufficient, especially given the decade-long gridlock in Geneva that has held up negotiations on the cut-off.
7) UN Security Council Resolution 1172 calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stop producing fissile material for weapons, among other nuclear risk reduction measures. Your government is bound by the UN Charter to support the implementation of this resolution and states at this meeting should reiterate their commitment to the prompt realization of its goals.
Conclusion
The initiative for nuclear cooperation with India threatens to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime by granting India the benefits of nuclear commerce only accorded to NPT states parties, while securing no meaningful constraint on the growth of its nuclear weapons stockpile or commitment by India to accept the legal equivalent of the obligations set forth in Articles I and VI of the NPT.
We call on all NPT states parties to judge the proposal for nuclear cooperation according to the commitments they have made under the treaty and in the context of NPT Review Conferences, and according to the obligations imposed by UN Security Council resolutions passed in the aftermath of the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Rather than create exceptions to the rules of behavior expected of responsible states, NPT states parties should reaffirm the need for universal adherence to the treaty and for nuclear disarmament.
Thank you.
Individual Endorsements of Jan. 7, 2008 letter
click here for a full list of signatories.
Article in News in Review (30 April 2008, No. 3)
US-India Nuclear Agreement: Bad for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Bad for Nuclear Disarmament
The US-India nuclear agreement will be the topic of a workshop in the NGO Room this morning (2 May 2008). The agreement has attracted a great deal of attention and concern since it was announced in 2005 by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Many believe that given the implications of the agreement for the nonproliferation regime, it should be on the official agenda of this NPT Prepcom and that any final decision should wait for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
The most authoritative and credible statement about the implications of the agreement for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was a letter sent in January this year to more than four-dozen governments by a prestigious and broad array of more than 130 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries. Among the experts who signed the letter was Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and President of the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Nongovernmental organizations from South Asia, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Europe, Africa, and North America endorsed the letter. which was organized by the Abolition 2000 network's US-India Deal Working Group and the Washington-based Arms Control Association.
The letter formed the basis of the NGO presentation on the US-India nuclear agreement delivered at this PrepCom. It provides a litmus test against which proposals for allowing India to participate in nuclear trade should be measured.
The letter said the U.S. proposal to exempt India from longstanding global nuclear trade standards "would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament." The signatories wrote that "the proposed arrangement fails to bring India into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms."
What is at issue here are the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) ban on providing direct or indirect assistance for another state's nuclear weapons program and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines that severely restrict trade with states, such as India, that do not allow comprehensive international safeguards over all nuclear facilities and material in their territory. The United States seeks to exempt India from these restrictions even though India detonated a nuclear test in 1974 made with plutonium harvested from a Canadian and U.S.-supplied reactor in violation of peace nuclear use agreements, has not to joined the NPT, continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
As part of the agreement with the US, the Indian government has finalized with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) secretariat the text of a safeguards agreement to cover those reactors that India chooses to be civilian, leaving its military nuclear program and its fast breeder reactor program outside safeguards. This safeguards agreement has not been made public. Meanwhile, obstructions by some political parties on whose support the ruling coalition in Delhi depends, in addition to opposition from the opposition parties, has so far prevented India from submitting the text to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval.
If the IAEA and India sign a safeguards agreement, the matter will then go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By virtue of their veto power, each NSG member state has a pivotal role to play. It is not clear when the NSG will be asked to make a decision. The matter than goes to the US Congress for final approval of a US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
At the time of writing this article, it was looking unlikely that all these steps would be concluded within this year. However, negotiation of the agreement has been characterized by last minute fixes and sudden changes of tactics, so a sudden unexpected development should come as no surprise.
Given the damage the US-India agreement would do to the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system, there is much at stake for all NPT states and the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Indeed, by rights the matter should not be decided by the NSG at all. It should be fully debated within the context of the NPT.
Several countries made references to the US-India agreement, either directly or indirectly, during the 2007 NPT PrepCom, but the issue was not given the attention it deserves. Delegates at this year's PrepCom should thoroughly debate the issues raised by the US-India agreement, and any proposal to allow the agreement to proceed should be submitted as a recommendation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Philip White
Coordinator, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
Selected extracts from government statements and working papers delivered at the 28 April - 9 May 2008 NPT PrepCom
Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty (28 April 2008)
"NWS [Nuclear Weapon States], in cooperation among themselves and with NNWS [Non-Nuclear Weapons States], as well as with the States not Parties to the Treaty, must refrain from sharing of nuclear know-how for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. Without exception, there should also be a complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States which are not Parties to the Treaty. The recent developments in particular the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by a NWS with a non-party to the NPT is a matter of great concern, since in accordance with that agreement nuclear materials can be transferred to un-safeguarded facilities in violation of Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT which stipulates that cooperation of each State Party to the Treaty in providing equipment or material for peaceful purposes is not possible "unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by" the NPT. The 1995 decisions and principles and objective of nuclear non-proliferation further strongly confirms comprehensive safeguards as a condition for cooperation with non NPT parties in the nuclear field."
Egypt (28 April 2008)
"...we reiterate that the priority of achieving NPT Universality is a necessary first step towards the universal application and strengthening of IAEA Full Scope Safeguards."
"...Egypt underscores the dangers of engaging in nuclear cooperation between States Parties and other states not party to the Treaty, regardless of the motives declared or the intentions stated. Any such cooperation is in idrect contradiction to the spirit of Article 1 of the Treaty and the provisions of Para 12 of Decision II of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Such actions raise serious concerns amongst Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties as to the value added by remaining within the framework of the Treaty and consistently upholding and strengthening its Objectives. It is therefore necessary to reevaluate such forms of cooperation in view of their direct negative impact on the entire global non-proliferation regime."
Canada (5 May 2008)
"...both India and Pakistan have deeply-felt security concerns that must be addressed. While we continue to oppose any special status within the NPT that would seek to legitimize the development and possession of nuclear weapons by new states, we welcome India's willingness to accept additional non-proliferation obligations and we are closely following developments as India seeks to expand its nuclear cooperation. We will want to ensure that any develoopments in this regard do not weaken the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and recall the positions already taken by the NPT membership regarding conditions of supply.
In addition to signing and ratifying the CTBT, there are other steps that would reaffirm both India and Pakistan's stated commitments to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We urge both states to place their respective fuel cycles under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and both states, but especially Pakistan, to reinforce and strengthen national export control programs to impede secondary proliferation. We also urge both States to support the P6 proposal at the Conference on Disarmament and to agree to moratoria on fissile material production. Such actions would respect the expressed will of the international community and build confidence between the two states."
Japan (5 May 2008)
"With regard to South Asia, Japan appreciates recent efforts made by both India and Pakistan to promote confidence-building and thereby lessen the tensions between them. At the same time, Japan continues to urge both states to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition. We also believe that all the States not parties to the Treaty should take practical disarmament measures in support of the NPT. In this context, we urge India and Pakistan to continue their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear tests, and to sign and ratify the CTBT. As regards the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Japan encourages both states to continue cooperation and consultation with other countries in seeking actively an immediate commencement of the negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions, and pending the entry into force of the treaty, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.."
Egypt (6 May 2008)
"This regrettable situation is aggravated when nuclear weapon States parties enter into new agreements, or update existing ones, with states that are not parties and refuse to undertake any commitment in the field of disarmament, in order to enhance their capabilities in the field of power generation or nuclear safety without requiring from them to join the Treaty and apply the IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all their nuclear installations. The argument that these non parties do not have obligations to comply with in the first place is a futile argument. Any such agreement contravenes the spirit and text of the Treaty. It runs counter to the obligations of the nuclear weapon States parties under Article 1, paragraph 2 of article III and paragraph 12 of the Decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Principles and Objectives of the Treaty that considered the acceptance of the IAEA full scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons a precondition for new supply arrangements."
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