TO: The Board of Governors*, International Atomic Energy Agency
We write as members of the US-India Deal Working Group of ABOLITION 2000, a global network of over 2000 organizations in more than 90 countries working for a global treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons1. We wish to convey our concerns about the proposed negotiation of a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA pertaining to the eight nuclear facilities that India has declared as "civilian" as part of its agreement with the United States (the US-India nuclear deal).
Our concerns are outlined below.
1. The US-India Nuclear Deal
This safeguards agreement would facilitate a nuclear supply initiative that is deeply flawed, not least because it contradicts the full-scope safeguards standard that has been established in the context of the NPT, NSG, Treaty of Rarotonga, and Treaty of Pelindaba. IAEA member states must not allow themselves to be used to lend legitimacy to an arrangement that would compromise the full-scope safeguards regime they have worked so long to construct.
2. "India-specific Safeguards"
The proposed US-India agreement for nuclear cooperation (the '123 Agreement', 3 August 2007) refers to an "India-specific Safeguards Agreement" (Article 10). The IAEA should not approve a safeguards agreement which affords India any special privileges.
There is concern that India might seek "India specific safeguards" that make the safeguards contingent upon the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers. There is no precedent for dropping safeguards if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted. The Board of Governors should require that safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities be permanent and consistent with IAEA standards and practices.
The most likely reason why fuel supplies to India would be interrupted under the proposed arrangement is if India conducts a nuclear weapon test explosion. Any such test would amount to an Indian rejection of the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 demand that India not conduct further nuclear tests and that it should join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. IAEA General Conference Resolution GC(42)/RES/19 (25 September 1998) called on India (and Pakistan) to "become Parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without delay and without conditions." Furthermore, this resolution obliges all IAEA member states to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172. (The UN Security Council and IAEA General Conference Resolutions are attached.)
3. Partial Safeguards In Context
It has been argued by some that bringing additional Indian electricity-producing reactors under safeguards is a major step forward for nonproliferation. It is not.
So long as India maintains fissile material production and nuclear weapons-related facilities outside of safeguards, safeguards on additional electricity producing reactors are hardly worth their estimated annual cost of $10 million (USD). It is clear that if Nuclear Supplier Group states (or others) agree to supply India with uranium for its safeguarded reactors, this will free-up India's limited indigenous supplies for the purpose of plutonium and highly enriched uranium production and allow it to increase production of these fissile materials2. If supplier states agree to transfer sensitive nuclear technologies to Indian safeguarded facilities, the comprehensive safeguards system is ill-equipped to prevent the possible replication and use of such technologies in India's unsafeguarded military sector.
India has made clear also that it will only agree to Additional Protocol safeguards on the facilities that would be on its "civilian" list. The Board of Governors should obtain a detailed clarification from India and the Director General on the nature and form of the Additional Protocol agreement that India will pursue before it considers any other safeguards agreement for India. IAEA member states should require that the Additional Protocol be applied and implemented so as to prevent the misuse of any nuclear equipment or material that India imports.
Conclusion
In view of the above concerns, we urge you to ensure that there is no rush to judgment in the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA. The goal of the Board of Governors during the negotiations should be to ensure that the US-India deal comply fully with current international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, principles, and norms.
Philip White, US-India Deal Working Group Coordinator
Steven Staples, Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000
10 September 2007
Notes and References
1. The US-India Deal Working Group was established at ABOLITION 2000's Annual General Meeting, May 2007, Vienna. The website for the group is as follows: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html
2. Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report #1, September 2006, http://www.ipfmlibrary/rr01.pdf
Endorsed by Members of Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
Lisa Clark (Italy), Beati i costruttori di pace (Blessed Are the Peacemakers) and Italian Disarmament Network
Beatrice Fihn (Sweden), Womens' International League for Peace and Freedom
Shelagh Foreman (USA), Massachusetts Peace Action
Jim Green (Australia), Friends of the Earth Australia
Regina Hagen (Germany), International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
Xanthe Hall (Germany), International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
John Hallam (Australia), People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW - Nuclear Flashpoints
David Heller (Belgium), Friends of the Earth Flanders & Brussels
Hidemichi Kano (Japan), Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs
Akira Kawasaki (Japan), Peace Boat
Ak Malten (The Netherlands), Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance
Nouri Abdul Razzak Hussain (Egypt), Secretary-General, Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
Sukla Sen (India), National Coordination Committee Member, Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace
Hari P. Sharma (Canada), Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Simon Fraser University and President, SANSAD (South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy)
Steven Staples (Canada), Director, Rideau Institute on International Affairs, Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000
Heinz Stockinger (Austria), PLAGE - Independent Platform Against Nuclear Dangers
Aaron Tovish (USA), International Manager, Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign
David Webb (UK), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Gunnar Westberg (Sweden), International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Philip White (Japan), Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Working Group Contact Address:
c/- Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5, Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800 Fax: 03-3357-3801
* Member States represented on the IAEA Board for 2006-2007 are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
