The Hon John Howard MP
Prime Minister
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600
AUSTRALIA

Dear Mr. Howard,

The US-India Working Group of the Abolition 2000 network is writing to urge the Australian government to ensure that the US-India nuclear deal does not weaken the nonproliferation regime. Abolition 2000 is a global network of over 2000 groups from over 90 countries working for nuclear disarmament. We are concerned about the implications of this deal for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for the following reasons:

1. The deal violates the NPT (see analysis in Abolition 2000 Briefing Paper1 distributed to diplomats at the NPT PrepCom in May this year).
2. The deal violates a unanimous 1998 UN Security Council Resolution calling on India and Pakistan "immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons." Neither India nor Pakistan has complied with this demand. The Resolution also "encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons."
3. By permitting nuclear trade with India, which developed nuclear weapons outside the framework of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and which has made no commitment to abandoning its nuclear weapons, the deal sends precisely the wrong message to countries which might be thinking of developing nuclear weapons themselves. Such countries will conclude that they will not be denied the privileges of nuclear trade for long.
4. The three other countries which remain outside the NPT - Pakistan, Israel and North Korea - will expect the same treatment as India. Israel and Pakistan have already asked for this.
5. The deal puts no pressure on the five officially recognized nuclear weapons states to give up their nuclear weapons. Rather, it effectively recognizes India as a sixth nuclear weapon state.

Summary of US-India nuclear deal
In July 2005 the US and India agreed on the terms of a deal to change US laws that, since India's 1974 nuclear test, have blocked the export of nuclear technology and fuel to states that are not Parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The 1974 test was conducted using plutonium separated with technical assistance provided under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. The plutonium came from spent fuel rods of the CIRUS reactor provided by Canada in 1954 and the heavy water to run the reactor came from the US. These laws are almost three decades old and sought to prevent states that are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from using commercial imports of nuclear technology and fuel to aid their nuclear weapons ambitions. In December 2006, US President George W. Bush signed legislation that exempts India from such conditions.

Increased nuclear weapons materials
A report for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (an independent group of nuclear experts from 15 countries) has shown that the US-India nuclear deal could allow India to significantly increase its stock of nuclear weapons materials (see article by Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, Frank von Hippel, "Feeding potential for South Asia's nuclear fire"2). Pakistan has already expressed its fears about the deal and warned of increasing its own stock of nuclear weapons material.

Statements by various governments at the NPT PrepCom
Several governments expressed concern about the deal during the NPT PrepCom held in May this year in Vienna (see attached excerpts3). Switzerland was particularly clear in its criticism. The New Agenda Coalition countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) made a statement indicating that they consider the deal to be a contradiction of the NPT. Several other countries called on the four countries outside the NPT to join as non-nuclear weapon states. Whether or not they mentioned India by name, these governments all articulated positions that were completely inconsistent with acceptance of the US-India nuclear deal.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: a role for Australia
To bring the U.S.-India deal into force requires a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of countries. Since the Group works by consensus, each of the 45 NSG members must agree to change its rules and allow nuclear sales to India. As an NSG member and as a major uranium exporter, Australia is in a position to exert considerable influence on this issue.

You have been quoted in the media as being generally supportive of the deal. However, the Australian government has not yet given a clear indication of the position it will take in the NSG and Resources Minister, Ian Macfarlane, has said that Australia will not export uranium to India. The reason he gave was, "We have a prohibition on the basis they have not signed the NPT."4

As illustrated above, there is a grave risk that the US-India deal will weaken the non-proliferation regime. In order to prevent this from happening, Australia should demand the following in the NSG:

1. that India agree to stop producing fissile materials;
2. that India join the CTBT;
3. that India accept full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities;
4. that India join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

It is also reasonable to demand concessions from the US, the other partner to the deal. Minimum conditions for changing the rules of the NSG should include US ratification of the CTBT and commitment to a verifiable FMCT.

Australia has long been a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The above demands are completely consistent with Australian policy and Australia should take this opportunity to push its disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

Other international fora
Only 45 states are able to participate in decision making at the NSG. However, the US-India deal is a matter of concern to all countries. As indicated in the attached Briefing Paper, we believe the 2010 NPT Review Conference is the appropriate decision making forum. In the short to medium term, Australia should also express its concerns about the deal at the following fora:

1. the (autumn) 2007 UN General Assembly in New York;
2. the 2008 NPT PrepCom, since the deal undermines the NPT and prospects for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Philip White, US-India Working Group Coordinator
Anthony Salloum, on behalf of Abolition 2000 Secretariat, Steven Staples (Rideau Institute)

References....
1. Abolition 2000 Briefing Paper distributed to diplomats at the May 2007 NPT PrepCom (copy enclosed)
2. Paper by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana available on the web site of the International Panel on Fissile Materials: http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf
Op-ed article by Zia Mian, Frank von Hippel and M.V. Ramana:
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200703290073.html
3. Excerpts from official statements at the May 2007 NPT PrepCom are pasted below.
4. Quoted in "No uranium for India: Macfarlane", article by Katharine Murphy published in the The Age on May 23, 2007

Switzerland (30 April 2007)
"...the project of co-operation in the field of civilian nuclear energy between India and the USA will not be without consequences for the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. If this project is carried out it will call into question the validity of the compromise which enabled a consensus to be found on the extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference."

Cuba on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty (30 April 2007)
"Nuclear-weapon States, in cooperation among themselves and with non-nuclear-weapons States, and with States not Parties to the Treaty, must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
There should also be total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States that are not Parties to the Treaty, without exception."

Japan (30 April 2007)
"For the purpose of achieving the universality of the NPT, Japan reiterates its calls for India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States."

Germany (on behalf of the European Union) (30 April 2007)
5. The EU Member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of and universal compliance with the NPT. The possession of nuclear weapons by states outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by states party to the Treaty undermine non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Therefor the EU continues, in accordance with the Common Position of 25 April 2005 mentioned above, to call on all States not party to the NPT to pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament and to call upon those states to become States Parties to the NPT as Non Nuclear Weapon States.

Ireland (on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition) (1 May 2007)
"While the NPT's membership now comprises almost the entire international community, the Treaty has not achieved universality despite its entry into force 37 years ago. This remains a source of concern to the New Agenda Coalition. The Coalition has consistently called upon all States Parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, and urges India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet Parties to the Treaty, to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon-States promptly and without conditions."

New Agenda Coalition (1 May 2007)
From working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition (1 May 2007)
"14. Considering that universality is highlighted in Decision II of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as an essential element in achieving international peace and security and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that concrete steps are taken towards achieving this pivotal goal in order to fully realize both the declared objectives of the Treaty and the commitments made by the States Parties to the Treaty as part of the consensus package of decisions and resolutions achieved at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
15. The New Agenda Coalition calls upon all States Parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, and in that regard urges India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet Parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without any conditions.
16. The New Agenda Coalition recalls that, at the Review Conference in 2000, States Parties reaffirmed the unanimous agreement at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 not to enter into new nuclear supply arrangements with parties that did not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities."

Malaysia (1 May 2007)
"Malaysia is of the view that such cases whereby a non-party is accorded preferential treatment in comparison to States Parties, constitutes a gross violation of the spirit and letter of the Treaty....Malaysia is also concerned that access by certain States not party to the NPT to nuclear materials, technology and know-how that could be diverted to the development of nuclear weapons, is being facilitated by certain nuclear weapon States. In this regard, if States Parties are serious in achieving the goal of universalising the Treaty, they would join Malaysia in calling for a total and complete prohibition on the transfer of all nuclear related materials, resources, assistance and cooperation in nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty, without exception."

United Arab Emirates (1 May 2007)
"...our main priority should be to enhance our deliberations in this meeting by focusing on six main axes, which will contribute towards making gradual scientific progress towards nuclear disarmament...
5- Taking more effective measures to ensure accession of States that are not party to the Treaty to do so in order to strengthen the universality and effectiveness of the Treaty."

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