| Criteria for Evaluation |
Scenario 1 |
Scenario 2 |
Scenario 3 |
Scenario 4 |
Points for consideration |
| Safety assurance |
NPP Sec.: Almost no possibility that a difference between the scenarios will arise in regard to safety assurance.
CNIC: 1. For scenarios 1 and 2 there is increased risk, because of the possibility of an accident at the reprocessing plant or at the MOX fuel fabrication plant.
2. Scenario 1 has FBR as its long term aim. There is therefore the additional risk of an accident at the FBR. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Almost no possibility that a difference between the scenarios will arise in regard to safety assurance.
2. In regard to direct disposal, some aspects should be considered in the same way as scenario 3.
CNIC: For scenarios 1 and 2 there is increased risk, because of the possibility of an accident at the reprocessing plant or at the MOX fuel fabrication plant. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Almost no possibility that a difference between the scenarios will arise in regard to safety assurance.
2. As things stand now, it is necessary to accumulate technical knowledge about direct disposal of spent fuel that takes into account Japan's natural conditions. It is also necessary to deal with issues associated with the effects of alpha radiation from large quantities of plutonium, etc..
CNIC: In scenario 3 there is no risk of accidents at a reprocessing plant or MOX fabrication facility. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Almost no possibility that a difference between the scenarios will arise in regard to safety assurance.
2. In the case where direct disposal is selected, some points to be considered are the same as scenario 3.
CNIC: For the time being, same as scenario 3. |
CNIC: The fact that operation of the reprocessing plant entails major risk is totally absent from this proposal. |
| Resource conservation and stability of supply (energy security) |
NPP Sec.: 1. 10%-20% reduced requirement for uranium as a result of LWR cycle (pluthermal).
2. If a shift to FBR is possible in future, it may be possible to obtain a more or less permanent national source of fuel.
3. Reprocessing technology diversifies energy security policy options.
CNIC: 1. This doesn't take into account the risk that the reprocessing plant won't work as well as hoped. In that case the continued generation of nuclear power would be threatened.
2. The cost-benefit trade off of any uranium saving must be considered. With no prospect of the FBR becoming a reality, this investment is a total waste of money.
3. Energy policy loses flexibility as a result of the fixation with reprocessing. There is a danger that the risk for energy security will be exacerbated. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Same as scenario 1 for the reprocessed portion. (However it doesn't have the merits of the FBR case.)
2. Same as scenario 3 for the un-reprocessed portion.
CNIC: Same as scenario 1. |
NPP Sec.: The situation where the uranium resource can only be used for a [limited] time will continue and there will be no benefit from reduced resource use.
CNIC: No adverse impacts from problems at the reprocessing plant. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In the case where reprocessing is undertaken in future, 10%-20% reduced requirement for uranium as a result of LWR cycle (pluthermal). If a shift to FBR is possible in future, it may be possible to obtain a more or less permanent national source of fuel.
2. In the case where direct disposal is selected, the same as scenario 3.
CNIC: For the time being, same as scenario 3. |
NPP Sec.: 1. There is uncertainty in regard to the world energy situation in the first half of the 21st century, for example in regard to the Middle East situation and China's demand for energy. It is therefore necessary to be prepared. In regard to the uranium resource, there may be shocks to supply and demand caused by increased demand from China and others and the drying up of the supply from dismantled weapons.
2. It is possible that restrictions on the use of fossil fuels will become stronger in the second half of the 21st century.
CNIC: 1. Security of supply is addressed solely from the perspective of savings in resource use. The risk to energy supply that might be caused by problems at, or an accident at the reprocessing plant are not addressed in this proposal.
2. If you wish to address energy supply, you can't only consider savings in uranium use. Comparisons with other resources are also necessary. In particular, the potential of renewable energy is extremely good, even when environmental and cost-benefit factors are considered.
- European Union: 20% of primary energy by 2020 (6% in 1997)
- China: 20% of electricity produced from renewables by 2020 (5% in 2003)
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Environmental compatibility
(compatibility with a closed-loop economy) |
NPP Sec.: Reprocessing aims to recover and reuse resources and thus reduce waste. Reducing the quantity of resources used and waste produced, reusing and recycling create a closed-loop economy. Reprocessing is consistent with this philosophy.
CNIC: 1. In scenarios 1 and 2, radioactive substances will be routinely released into the environment as a result of reprocessing.
2. The concept of a closed-loop economy is reduce, reuse, recycle, in that order. The first principle is reduction of harmful environmental impacts. To leave out that principle and just emphasize the final principle of recycling is contrary to this concept. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Same as scenario 1 for the reprocessed portion. (However it doesn't have the merits of the FBR case.)
2. Same as scenario 3 for the un-reprocessed portion.
CNIC: 1. In scenarios 1 and 2, radioactive substances will be routinely released into the environment as a result of reprocessing.
2. The concept of a closed-loop economy is reduce, reuse, recycle, in that order. The first principle is reduction of harmful environmental impacts. To leave out that principle and just emphasize the final principle of recycling is contrary to this concept. |
NPP Sec.: Compared to scenario 1 (full reprocessing), less consistent with the closed-loop economy philosophy.
CNIC: No environmental impact from a reprocessing plant. From the prespective of limiting environmental impact, not necessarily incompatible with the closed-loop economy concept. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In the case where reprocessing is implemented in future, the same as scenario 1.
2. In the case where reprocessing is not implemented in future, the same as scenario 3. |
CNIC: 1. Assessment of environmental appropriateness is reduced to the concept of 'closed-loop economy'. Furthermore, it is based on an incorrect understanding of this concept.
2. The objective should be a sustainable society. From an energy perspective, sustainability derives from a shift to renewable energy (getting rid of both fossil fuels and nuclear) and the efficient use of energy. Reprocessing/plutonium is both unsustainable and, due to the fact that it spreads waste, it is inconsistent with the closed-loop economy concept. |
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Total volume of radioactive waste generated (or area required for disposal) based on generation capacity of 58GWe |
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NPP Sec.: 1. In the case where reprocessing is implemented in future, the same as scenario 1.
2. In the case where reprocessing is not implemented in future, the same as scenario 3. |
NPP Sec.: 1. The disposal of HLW is more problematic than LLW.
2. So it is not possible to simply add the volumes of HLW and LLW.
3. The volume of HLW produced in the reprocessing case is reduced to 30%~40% of the volume produced in the case of direct disposal. (Surface area is reduced to 1/2~2/3.)
CNIC: If you take into account the TRU waste and spent MOX fuel destined for burial, the above claimed reduction is dubious. The area might even increase. |
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High level radioactive waste (HLW) |
NPP Sec.: Glass Canisters:
Approx 14,000m3 (approx. 140,000m2)
TRU waste generation: 18,000m3
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NPP Sec.: Glass Canisters:
Approx 9,100m3 (approx. 90,000m2)
Spent fuel: 2,300~3,200m3 (approx. 130,000~160,000m2)
[Of this, spent MOX fuel 1,400~1,900m3 (80,000~90,000m2)] |
NPP Sec.:
Spent fuel: 3,800~5,200m3 (approx. 210,000~250,000m2) |
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Low level radioactive waste (LLW) |
NPP Sec.: Approx 19,000m3 (approx. 17,000m2) |
NPP Sec.: Approx 17,000m3 (approx. 15,000m2) |
NPP Sec.: Approx 15,000m3 (approx. 11,000m2) |
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NPP Sec.: 1. Includes waste generated in the process of disposal. In regard to HLW, two cases are indicated, based on direct disposal in soft rock: 2 assemblies per canister and 4 assemblies per canister.
2. The area required for the disposal of HLW is calculated on the basis of the area occupied by the waste.
3. The volume and surface area required to dispose of spent MOX fuel is calculated as 4 times that required for the same amount (tHM) of spent uranium fuel. |
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Latent damage from radioactivity of high level waste |
NPP Sec.: 1. The latent radiological impact 1,000 years from now of the HLW (glass canisters) produced under this scenario is used as a reference for comparison.
2. The damage could possibly be reduced by a factor of 30 compared to this reference level if FBR were to be implemented in future.
CNIC: If both TRU and glass canisters are considered, reprocessing won't reduce harmful impacts at all. |
NPP Sec.: Spent fuel and glass canisters are both high level radioactive waste. Their latent radiological impacts are as indicated in scenarios 1, 3. |
NPP Sec.: Using the glass canister HLW of scenario 1 (full reprocessing) as a reference, the latent radiological impact after 1,000 years of the HLW in scenario 3 (spent fuel) will be 8 times as great. |
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CO2 generated |
NPP Sec.: Essentially no difference between scenarios (no CO2 generated). |
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Usability as resource (recycle) |
NPP Sec.: 1. In LWR (pluthermal) the nuclear fuel cycle has the effect of reusing 10%-20% of the uranium resource (13% through use of plutonium; 26% if recovered uranium also used)
2. If a shift to FBR is possible in future, it may be possible to obtain a more or less permanent national source of fuel.
CNIC: There is no sign that FBR will be implemented. Such things should not be included in the assessment. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Same as scenario 1 for the reprocessed portion. (However it doesn't have the merits of the FBR case.)
2. Same as scenario 3 for the un-reprocessed portion. |
NPP Sec.: Uranium and Plutonium resources disposed of as waste. Not consistent with the closed-loop economy concept.
CNIC: It is necessary to consider whether maintaining the reprocessing option could be an obstacle to the development of other energy sources. If that is the case, from the perspective of guaranteeing availability of a variety of resources, scenario 3 is more compatible with the closed-loop economy concept. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In the case where reprocessing is selected in future, the same as scenario 1.
2. In the case where direct disposal is chosen, the same as scenario 3. |
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Economic considerations
(cost of nuclear fuel cycle)
(values based on 2% discount rate) |
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NPP Sec.: 1. The difference between generating cost and nuclear fuel cycle cost (see Scenarios 1-4) employs calculations of the Subcommittee to Study Costs and Other Issues of the Electricity Industry Committee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (January 2004). In the case of a capacity factor of 80% and a discount rate of 2%, the unit price of electricity is 5.1 yen/kWh and of the nuclear fuel cycle is 1.53 yen/kWh. The generating cost can be calculated by adding the difference, (5.1-1.5 =) 3.6 yen/kWh, to the nuclear fuel cycle cost in scenarios 1-4.
2. The cost of direct disposal of spent fuel calculated here does not take into account various uncertainties. For this reason, it is appropriate to think that the range of uncertainty in these costs is larger than the range shown in this calculation.
3. Depending on the scenario, depleted uranium and recovered uranium are disposed of or stored for future use. However, the economic value and costs of these are not calculated*. The economic value of plutonium is taken to be zero.
* The storage cost of the uranium recovered at the reprocessing plant is included under reprocessing costs.
CNIC: A cost comparison of full reprocessing against the direct disposal of spent fuel was examined 10 years ago in 1994, but these discussions were not made public. Reprocessing has been claimed to have merit, but the basis for this claim has remained vague. The cost of a policy change that is added onto scenarios 3 and 4 arises as a result of these untransparent circumstances. Questions must be asked about the responsibility for producing this loss.
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NPP Sec.: 1. Based on the current price of uranium, the fuel cycle cost (about 20%-30% of total cost of generation) of direct disposal is around 0.5 - 0.7 yen per kWh cheaper than reprocessing.
2. That part of the cost of a change of policy that can be quantified (costs associated with Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and replacement thermal plants) is around 0.9 - 1.5 yen per kWh, distributed over the power produced in a 59 year period. |
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Cost of generating nuclear power |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.2 yen/kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.0~5.1 yen /kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 4.5~4.7 yen/kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 4.7~4.8 yen/kWh |
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Portion attributable to nuclear fuel cycle |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 1.6 yen/kWh
(front end 0.63 yen; back end 0.93 yen) |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 1.4~1.5 yen/kWh
(front end 0.63 yen; back end 0.77~0.85 yen) |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 0.9~1.1 yen/kWh
(front end 0.61 yen; back end 0.32~0.46 yen) |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 1.1~1.2 yen/kWh
(front end 0.61 yen; back end 0.48~0.55 yen) |
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Cost of policy change |
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NPP Sec.: Approx. 0.9~1.5 yen/kWh
Associated with Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: approx 0.2 yen/kWh
Associated with substitute thermal plants: approx. 0.7~1.3 yen/kWh |
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(Reference value)
Cost of generating nuclear power + Cost of policy change |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.2 yen/kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.0~5.1 yen/kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.4~6.2 yen/kWh |
NPP Sec.: Approx. 5.6~6.3 yen/kWh |
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Assumptions when calculating cost of policy change |
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NPP Sec.: 1. There are various issues associated with a change of policy, including the possibility of losing the trust of the host region, but here we have calculated those costs which, based on certain assumptions, can be quantified.
2. The probability of closing down nuclear power plants as a result of a change of policy can't be said to be quantifiable, however when calculating costs associated with replacement thermal plants, the dates for commencement of operations after the policy change are set at (i) 2015 and (ii) 2020. This assumes that within this time period it will be possible to obtain the understanding of a host region for the interim storage facility and to implement the policy. The region will need to understand that since this site does not assume reprocessing, it will require a much larger storage capacity. |
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NPP Sec.: *If the cost of the second reprocessing plant is a half that of the first, the 'cycle' cost works out at 1.5 yen/kWh. |
The range of costs will depend on the different types of rock, etc..
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| Nuclear non-proliferation |
NPP Sec.: 1. We believe it is possible for our country to maintain high non-proliferation standards for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication, because we can look forward to the development of strict safeguards and protection of nuclear material that can be agreed as a cooperative international effort and applied to large scale reprocessing plants and because we can also look forward to the application of strict safeguards and protection of nuclear materials to the future MOX fuel fabriction plant. [*Translator's Comment]
2. Regarding the future FBR system, R&D is proceeding into reprocessing and fuel fabrication that incorporates lots of impurities, increasing inherent non-proliferation, so that widescale use can become possible.
3. It is important to promote international understanding of Japan's promise to strictly limit use to peaceful purposes, to endeavour to perfect the non-proliferation system, and to actively pursue technological improvements.
CNIC: 1. This is an age when even senior government officials make public comments about 'a nuclear armed Japan'. This is a problem of a different dimension for non-proliferation compared to purely technological problems.
2. This is particularly true in regard to FBR, which will produce nuclear weapons grade plutonium. |
NPP Sec: Same as scenario 1 during the preriod that reprocessing is continuing. After that the same as for scenario 3. |
NPP Sec.: 1. We believe that, by adopting appropriate safeguards and measures for the protection of nuclear material, it will be possible for our country to maintain high non-proliferation standards for the direct disposal of spent fuel
2. However the temptation for diversion of this material will continue for between hundreds and tens of thousands of years after disposal. It will be necessary to develop and implement an efficient and effective internationally agreed monitoring and physical protection system against intrusion.
CNIC: Direct disposal is being adopted by countries other than Japan, so it will be possible to get international cooperation in dealing with the 'temptation for diversion' of this material. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In the case where reprocessing is selected in future, the same as scenario 1. In the case where direct disposal of all spent fuel is chosen, the same as scenario 3.
2. After deciding the policy, it will be very important to revisit the technical development projects and negotiations associated with the agreements on safeguards and protection of nuclear material concluded with the IAEA and the USA et al (bilateral agreements). After that it is highly likely that it will take at least 10 years to establish internationally agreed measures. |
NPP Sec.: In the case where reprocessing is selected, depending on progress with pluthermal, for a time the plutonium stockpile could increase. It is extremely important to manage the plutonium in a strict and transparent manner. |
| Technical viability |
NPP Sec.: There appears to be no particular technical issue that would make implementation impossible. However, economic viability needs to be improved and continued R&D into implementation etc. of FBR nuclear fuel cycle is needed.
CNIC: There is a strong possibility that FBR will not be viable, the use of plutonium will be abandoned and the situation will revert scenario 2. In that case, the delay in R&D into direct disposal may prove to be a major problem. |
NPP Sec.: 1. Same as scenario 1 for the reprocessed portion. (However the R&D for implementation of the FBR case is not required.)
2. Same as scenario 3 for the un-reprocessed portion. |
NPP Sec.: Accumulated knowledge taking into account Japan's natural conditions in relation to direct disposal of spent fuel is lacking at this stage. R&D is necessary. |
NPP Sec.: In the situation where the technology choices will be made 50 years in the future, it will be necessary to maintain the technology base and continue R&D for reprocessing in parallel with R&D for direct disposal, but there will be many problems in regard to finance and the maintenance of technology that cannot be held in records.
CNIC: It isn't necessary to hold off technology choices for 50 years. It will be possible to provide finance to maintain basic technology and to check progress every few years. |
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Social acceptability
(problems finding a site) |
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CNIC: Another factor causing the difficulty in finding sites for nuclear facilities is public lack of trust in nuclear power. That lack of trust might increase, but it is unlikely to disappear if full reprocessing is chosen in the long term nuclear program. |
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Second reprocessing facility |
NPP Sec.: Quite a large scale reprocessing plant will be required by around 2050. |
NPP Sec.: Not required. |
NPP Sec.: Not required. However steps to dismantle or convert to other uses the Rokkasho Reprocessing Facility will be necessary. |
NPP Sec.: 1. For the time being steps to dismantle or convert to other uses the Rokkasho Reprocessing Facility will be necessary.
2. Also, in the case where reprocessing is implemented in future, by 2050 are quite large reprocessing facility will be necessary. |
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MOX fuel fabrication facility |
NPP Sec.: 1. A MOX fuel fabrication plant in the order of 120 ton/year will be required very soon after the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant becomes operational.
2. Also, quite a large scale MOX fuel fabrication plant will be required by around 2050. |
NPP Sec.: 1. A MOX fuel fabrication plant in the order of 120 ton/year will be required very soon after the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant becomes operational. |
NPP Sec.: Not required. |
NPP Sec.: In the case where reprocessing is implemented in future, quite a large scale MOX fuel fabrication plant will be required by around 2050. |
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Interim storage facility (5000 ton) |
NPP Sec.: 3-6 sites will be required by around 2050. Because the total quantity will be recycled, the storage facility's interim status will be clear. |
NPP Sec.: 1. For the time being, the same number as for scenario 1.
2. However, if details of the direct disposal plan and activities to choose a site do not emerge, local people may lose confidence in its interim status and it could become difficult to find a site. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In order to keep nuclear power plants running it is possible that an interim storage facility will become necessary in the very near future. 9~12 facilities will be required by 2050.
2. Also if details of the direct disposal plan and activities to choose a site do not emerge, local people may lose confidence in its interim status and it could become difficult to find a site. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In order to keep nuclear power plants running it is possible that an interim storage facility will become necessary in the very near future. 9~12 facilities will be required by 2050.
2. Also in the situation where no decision is made about the nuclear fuel cycle policy, local people may lose confidence in its interim status and it could become difficult to find a site. |
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Disposal site |
NPP Sec.: A disposal site for glass canisters will be required by around 2035. A site will also be required for TRU waste.
CNIC: If spent fuel is reprocessed, disposal of TRU will be necessary. The safety assessments indicate that the radiation exposure resulting from burial of TRU waste will be around 100 times that for glass canisters. However there is no policy regarding selection of a disposal site for TRU waste. What grounds are there for confidence if the reprocessing plant becomes operational and selection of a disposal site for glass canisters proceeds, while this important issue is left to be dealt with later? |
NPP Sec.: A disposal site for both glass canisters and spent fuel will be necessary. |
NPP Sec.: Until sufficient knowledge emerges in regard to the direct disposal of spent fuel, it will be difficult to seriously start looking for a site. |
NPP Sec.: Until a decision is made about the handling of spent fuel, it will be unclear what type of disposal facility is required, so it will be difficult to look for a site. |
| Assurance of choice (flexibility) |
NPP Sec.: 1. The current human, technical and knowledge bases will be maintained, along with the international understanding. It will be possible to adapt to changing circumstances.
2. If the scale of nuclear power generation shrinks greatly, time would be required to adapt and change the nuclear policy.
CNIC: Just because you go ahead with the current policy and start up the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant doesn't guarantee that you will be able to achieve 'innovations in nuclear fuel cycle technology'. |
NPP Sec.: 1. It won't be possible to achieve innovations in nuclear fuel cycle technology in future. However, for the time being, it will be easier to make policy changes to enable such innovations than for scenario 3.
2. If the scale of nuclear power generation shrinks greatly, it will be easier to adapt and change the nuclear policy than for scenario 1. |
NPP Sec.: 1. It won't be possible to achieve innovations in nuclear fuel cycle technology in future. It will be more difficult to make policy changes to enable such innovations than for scenarios 2 and 4.
2. If the scale of nuclear power generation shrinks greatly, it would be unnecessary to adapt and change the nuclear policy. |
NPP Sec.: 1. In order to make policy decisions in future, it will be necessary to maintain technology and human resource, but this will be problematic from the point of view of national and private finances. The standard will probably be low.
2. It will be difficult to maintain international understanding of reprocessing that is not commercialized.
3. Except where the scale of nuclear power generation shrinks greatly, it would be easier to adapt and change the nuclear policy than for scenario 3. |
NPP Sec.: There is a view that while Japan is strong, we should advance projects/investment that will assure flexibility in future.
CNIC: 1. Opinion is divided on how much nuclear power will be employed in future, so it is also possible to take the position that it is scenario 1 which is rigid.
2. If a judgment were made to decide policy after a few years of broad debate, or to resume after a postponement, it would be possible to maintain a minimum level of technology and human resources. |
| Issues associated with policy change |
NPP Sec.: This is the current policy, so no issues arise as a result of a change in policy.
CNIC: 1. Circumstances have changed since the nuclear fuel cycle policy was framed and the direction of future changes is very uncertain. The understanding of regions which have facilities that are involved in the nuclear fuel cycle should be obtained and the task of rebuilding mutual trust should begin immediately. The longer this task is delayed the more difficult it will become. If we flinch from wearing the social cost of this now, the burden left to future generations will be increased.
2. Scenario 1 represents a continuation of the current policy. The problems of the current policy and the problems that continuing down that path will produce should be strictly assessed. Really, this is the most important task in considering these policy scenarios.
3. For example, social acceptance of nuclear power is low, there are problems with implementation of pluthermal and there will be social conflict regarding the excess plutonium resulting from operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
4. Fukushima Prefecture is an example of the fact that the regions have lost their trust in the national policy. And at this point in time, the agreement of Aomori Prefecture is on very shaky ground. |
NPP Sec.: 1. There is a possibility that the trust of regions which have cooperated with national policy until now will be lost.
2. It will be necessary to begin R&D into direct disposal.
CNIC: Fukushima Prefecture is an example of the fact that the regions have lost their trust in the national policy. And at this point in time, the agreement of Aomori Prefecture is on very shaky ground. |
NPP Sec.: 1. There is a possibility that the trust of regions which have cooperated with national policy until now will be lost.
2. It will be necessary to begin R&D into direct disposal very soon.
3. It will be difficult to accept waste returned from overseas. There may be nowhere to put it.
4. It will be impossible to transport spent fuel from nuclear power plants to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. Some NPPs might have to cease operating.
5. It will be necessary to deal with the economic losses from the investments made by private companies in the nuclear fuel cycle.
CNIC: Re 1: The problem is how you go about putting together a new system, including issues related to the local region, in order to progress this option.
Re 2: Since it isn't possible in reality to reprocess all the spent fuel, this has to be started quickly anyway.
Re 3: It will be possible to tackle this through negotiations in good faith.
Re 4: As the Mayor of Mutsu has said, it will be possible to tackle this through negotiations in good faith.
Re 5: Looked at from the point of view of responsibility for the choice made 10 years ago [by electric power companies], it isn't necessary to consider this issue. However, if it is deemed that something should be done about it, it can be dealt with legislatively. |
NPP Sec.: In addition to the points mentioned under scenario 3, are the following points:
6. Due to the fact that the form of the high level waste is undecided, it is possible that progress will not be made in finding a site for disposal.
7. The direction of technological development will be unclear, because of the absence of a policy decision.
8. It is possible that international agreement will be lost, because of the absence of a policy decision. |
NPP Sec.: 1. There are uncertainties regarding the local response to a change in policy, but it is difficult to calculate the cost of this.
2. In order to gain understanding of a change in policy and to proceed with a new project could take a considerable amount of public effort and time.
CNIC: Even if we proceed with reprocessing, a situation may arise where a change in the international consensus, due to a change in US administration or in international opinion, is unavoidable. |
| Overseas trends |
NPP Sec.: France, Russia, China |
NPP Sec.: 1. Germany (gave up plans for a reprocessing plant in Germany in 1998; will continue reprocessing abroad until July 2005)
2. Switzerland (will continue reprocessing abroad until the end of 2006)
3. Belgium (since ceasing operation of its own reprocessing plant in 1974, reprocessed abroad until 1991)
CNIC: Germany, Switzerland and Belgium should be classified under scenario 3. |
NPP Sec.: US (Actually, it will be possible to retrieve spent nuclear fuel from Yucca Mountain), South Korea, Canada, Sweden, Finland
CNIC: Germany, Switzerland, Belgium |
NPP Sec.: No leading nation. |
Summary of international trends
NPP Sec.: 1. Each country is making a choice between reprocessing and direct disposal based on factors such as geo-politics, resources, scale of nuclear power, technology, future trends, cost competitiveness of nuclear power, etc..
2. It seems that countries with large scale nuclear power production and which intend to continue with nuclear power are choosing reprocessing.
CNIC: 1. The notion that countries with large scale nuclear power production are choosing reprocessing is a mistake.
2. It is necessary to consider why some countries are choosing particular scenarios and whether or not they are actually working. |
