Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak here today.

The title of my presentation is the 'Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: a nuclear proliferation issue'. The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is located in Aomori Prefecture, on the north-east tip of Honshu. Start-up has been delayed several times, but the current schedule is for it to commence operations in May 2007. You'll find some basic data on page 1 of the notes that we have prepared.

I chose this title, because in Japan Rokkasho is usually treated as if it wasn't a nuclear proliferation issue. This is very strange, given the fact that when fully operational, it will be able to separate enough plutonium to produce 1,000 nuclear weapons each year. To us it is obvious that it is a nuclear proliferation issue. With so much talk in the media about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, we would have thought that it would be obvious to others too. Unfortunately, the government and the media have colluded to suppress this issue. In the lead up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May, we at CNIC want to open the lid on this can of worms.

I will return to this later, but many people here might not be very familiar with reprocessing and its place in Japan's nuclear policy, so let me begin by explaining this a little.

Reprocessing refers to the process in which various components of spent nuclear fuel are separated out. So before talking about reprocessing, it is necessary to have some understanding of what nuclear fuel and spent nuclear fuel are. I don't want to bore you with too much detail, but it might be easier to follow the rest of what I say if you know a little of the basic science. You might find it useful to look at the information on pages 2 and 3 of the notes while I am talking.

Japan's nuclear power reactors (53 are now operational) all use low enriched uranium as fuel. If you are familiar with physics, you will know that there are several isotopes of uranium. Just one of these, uranium 235, produces most of the energy in the nuclear reactors that are used in Japan. In nuclear fuel this isotope is 'enriched' to around 4%, compared to just 0.7% in natural uranium. The rest of the uranium in fresh nuclear fuel is uranium 238. The numbers shown in the diagrams on pages 2 and 3 are slightly different, but on the left side you can see the composition of the nuclear fuel before it goes into the reactor. You can see that the composition is different when the fuel has been used up. You can also see that the nuclear reaction inside the reactor actually produces plutonium. Japan's spent nuclear fuel contains most of the uranium 238 that went into the reactor in the first place, plus some unused uranium 235, plus some 'fission products', plus some plutonium. In the end, about 1% of the spent fuel is plutonium.

This 1% represents total plutonium. However, plutonium has several isotopes. Some isotopes can be used to produce nuclear power. These isotopes are said to be 'fissile': plutonium-239 and plutonium-241. They can sustain a 'fission reaction', which means that they split into smaller elements when struck by a neutron. This process produces the energy which powers nuclear reactors.

But the extracted plutonium is not just a potential fuel for nuclear power plants. It can also be used to make nuclear weapons. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki used plutonium, (whereas the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used highly enriched uranium).

The government likes to pretend that the composition of Japan's plutonium makes it unsuitable for nuclear weapons. The component ratio of plutonium isotopes depends on how long the fuel is used in the reactor. This is called the fuel burn-up and if the fuel burn-up is high, you get a low component of fissile plutonium. If the ratio is around 70% of fissile plutonium, the compound is called reactor grade plutonium. The table on page 3 of the notes shows some typical compositions of plutonium. The government makes much of the distinction between reactor grade plutonium and weapons grade plutonium, pointing out that the plutonium from Japan's nuclear reactors is reactor grade, not weapons grade. But in fact nuclear weapons can also be made from reactor grade plutonium. For example, Hans Blix, former IAEA Director General, had this to say: "The Agency considers high burn-up reactor-grade plutonium and in general plutonium of any isotopic composition ... to be capable of use in a nuclear explosive device. There is no debate on the matter in the Agency's Department of Safeguards." (1990)

The rough outline I have given you here shows one of the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Perhaps you can begin to see the relevance of reprocessing for nuclear proliferation. Now let me turn to the history of Japan's reprocessing policy.

In 1956, the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan adopted a policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and extracting plutonium, so that it could be used in fast breeder reactors. They said that in this way they would be making the most effective use of the original uranium resource. The justification was that Japan is a resource poor country. There was plenty of coal, but Japan suddenly shifted to oil as its primary source of energy and the Japanese coal mining industry collapsed. These days Japan uses cheap imported coal. There is very little oil in Japan. The same applies to natural gas and 100% of the uranium used in Japan's nuclear reactors is imported.

The reprocessing policy has continued unchanged to this day. But development of the fast breeder reactor has not proceeded as smoothly as the Atomic Energy Commission had hoped. The prototype fast breeder reactor Monju suffered a major accident in 1995, when the sodium coolant leaked and caught fire. Since then it has been out of operation. At the moment modifications are being carried out and it is scheduled to recommence operating in 2007.

In the meantime, the government found it necessary to adopt a policy of using the extracted plutonium in light water reactors. Whereas Monju uses the highly explosive sodium as a coolant, light water reactors use ordinary water. Japan's nuclear power reactors are all of this type and the plan is to burn plutonium in these reactors. Since the fuel is actually a mixed oxide of plutonium and uranium, it is commonly referred to as MOX and burning MOX fuel in light water reactors is called 'pluthermal'. Pluthermal plans are proceeding around the country. In 1998 the Federation of Electric Power Companies announced its plutonium use plan. The plan was to burn in this way the plutonium extracted at reprocessing plants in the UK and France over the period from 1999 to 2010. However, as a result of opposition from citizens, the pluthermal plan hasn't been implemented in any light water reactors in Japan.

Over the past 50 years the situation has changed and it is clear that the fast breeder program is in trouble. The so-called 'once through' approach has become the international norm. That is, most countries have elected not to reprocess their spent nuclear fuel. There are major technical difficulties with fast breeder reactors, they are uneconomical, and they don't have the consent of the public, so most countries have withdrawn from the development of these reactors. However, in Japan the Atomic Energy Commission has been unable to make a break with the past and change the policy that it established 50 years ago. The interim report released last November by the Atomic Energy Commission's New Nuclear Policy-Planning Committee slavishly follows this established policy. And until the Fast Breeder Reactor becomes a reality, they plan to continue to consume plutonium using pluthermal.

I would like to make the following fundamental criticisms of the government's nuclear fuel cycle policy:
1. Japan already possesses 40 tons of plutonium, but there is no indication that the plan to use this plutonium will be implemented and there is no other new plan to use it (see the table on pages 4 and 5 of the notes);
2. it has become clear that the reprocessing policy is very expensive;
3. it has been pointed out that even if spent fuel is not reprocessed, uranium supplies will not dry up for at least the next few decades;
4. any savings in uranium use that might result from using plutonium could be achieved in other ways, for example by reducing the concentration of the uranium-235 in the enrichment tailings;
5. the nuclear proliferation problem that I will now discuss is hardly mentioned and the so-called 'peaceful use of nuclear energy' is only ever discussed in the context of Japan's 'national interest'.

Returning to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, as explained above, in the process of separating spent fuel from Japan's nuclear reactors into its component parts , this plant will also extract plutonium. Japan has operated an experimental reprocessing plant in Tokai Village in Ibaraki Prefecture since1978, but Rokkasho is on a much bigger scale. Whereas Tokai has extracted about 7 tons of plutonium so far, Rokkasho is supposed to be able to extract 8 tons per year. Since it is possible to make a nuclear weapon with 8 kilograms of plutonium (less if you have more advanced weapons technology), this works out at 1,000 Nagasaki-type bombs worth of plutonium per year.

What's my point, you ask. Am I suggesting that the government's real aim is to produce nuclear weapons? I don't know what the government's real aim is. Maybe some people in the government would like to do this. There have been some well-publicized comments from senior government members which suggest that at least they would like to consider the option. But Rokkasho is a nuclear proliferation problem, even if the government has no intention of making nuclear weapons. Why? Because of the precedent it sets for other countries.

You have probably heard about some of the calls for a moratorium on reprocessing of spent fuel and on uranium enrichment. Various versions of the moratorium idea have been proposed by George Bush, Mahomed ElBaradei, Kofi Annan and others. (You can see some extracts on page 6 of your notes.) They all recognize that if more and more countries acquire these technologies, there will be no controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Once you can separate plutonium, or make highly enriched uranium, it is a relatively small step to making a nuclear weapon. As far as George Bush is concerned, the prime suspects are Iran and North Korea. A lot of effort, and a lot of news print I might add, has been devoted to the problem of how to prevent these two countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. North Korea claims that it has already produced them. This is a real problem. Unfortunately, Japan's attitude isn't very helpful. While on the one hand people are saying that countries like Iran and North Korea shouldn't have uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, Japan is going ahead with the biggest facility of all.

The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is arguably the most significant of all the new nuclear fuel cycle projects in the world today. As described above, the scale of the project is huge. It will be the first commercial-scale reprocessing plant outside of the nuclear weapons states. As such, it sets a very bad precedent for other states which might wish to develop nuclear fuel cycle projects.

Other countries look at Japan with resentment in regard to Rokkasho. They perceive another layer of discrimination. The distinction between nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states that was written into the NPT inevitably bred resentment and fueled the desire among some non nuclear weapons states to develop their own nuclear weapons. Rokkasho creates another level of discrimination: between those non nuclear weapons states which may and those which may not develop nuclear fuel cycle projects.

The abovementioned calls for a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle projects represent a recognition of the dangers involved if more and more countries develop facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The Japanese government should recognize that by stubbornly pursuing its reprocessing policy it is giving an excuse to other countries to do the same. We wonder whether the government realizes just how dangerous this is.

On the other hand, if the Japanese government were to now show sensitivity to the concerns of other non nuclear weapons states by accepting a moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, this would send a powerful message to the world. The message that Japan needs to send the world is that now is not a time for stubborn pursuit of narrowly conceived 'national interests'. The stakes are just too high. Japan should show flexibility by announcing an indefinite moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant at the NPT Review Conference in May.

As the first nation to become the victim of a nuclear attack, and as the home to thousands of hibakusha who all fervently wish for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan must show that it is willing to live up to the expectations of the international community and of its own people. At the NPT Review Conference in May, the Japanese government should show leadership in the quest for nuclear disarmament.

We have written to the Prime Minister calling on him to announce an indefinite moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. You can see the letter on pages 8 and 9 of the notes. We believe that acceptance of this moratorium by the Japanese government will create the breakthrough that the world is hoping for at the forthcoming Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. If Japan shows leadership on this issue, other countries will follow.

The NPT Review Conference will be held in May and CNIC is sending two delegates to the NGO section of this conference. We will participate in two seminars about the issues raised in this presentation. We will participate in a Japanese seminar on Tuesday May 3 and an English seminar on Thursday May 5. I understand there will also be a Japanese seminar on May 2 before the CNIC delegation arrives. We hope the media will give good coverage of this issue during the course of the NPT. ElBaradei and others have drawn attention to the dangers. Governments must not be allowed to shirk this issue in the name of narrow 'national interests'.

Thank you for your attention.

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center