Russia Enriching Uranium for Japanese Companies

Press Release by Greenpeace Japan and Citizens' Nuclear Information Center

(released in Japanese on 9 April 2007)

Petition sent to Japanese government requesting that it terminate transactions commissioning uranium enrichment to Russia

International environment group Greenpeace Japan and Tokyo based Citizens' Nuclear Information Center today [9 April 2007] sent a letter to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Minister of Economy Trade and Industry Akira Amari, and Foreign Minister Taro Aso requesting the Japanese government to terminate transactions commissioning uranium enrichment to Russia¹. The petition requests that the government:

1. terminate all transactions between Japanese and Russian companies related to uranium enrichment until a nuclear cooperation agreement covering the transfer of nuclear materials has been concluded and has come into force between Japan and Russia; and
2. not approve any transactions where "peaceful use" is not assured under a bilateral agreement.

Media reports in February indicated that the Japanese and Russian governments would begin negotiations towards conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement². According to these reports, since no Japan-Russia agreement covering the transfer of nuclear materials exists at present, a bilateral agreement would be concluded to enable Japan to commission uranium enrichment to Russia.

However, our research has revealed that electric power companies, including Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), have already signed contracts and begun transactions for uranium enrichment with a Russian enrichment company and that the Japanese government has approved these contracts³. TEPCO signed the first contract in 1999 and other companies followed later.

The purpose of bilateral agreements is to ensure "peaceful use" and to prevent nuclear proliferation. In their letter to the Japanese government, Greenpeace Japan and the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center maintained that a bilateral cooperation agreement should be a precondition of any approval for transactions involving the transfer of nuclear materials. They said that it is unacceptable to proceed with nuclear business transactions before such assurances are in place.

1. See letter below
2. Yomiuri Shimbun 21 February 2007, Nihon Keizai Shimbun 27 February 2007, etc.
3. "Reply to Question regarding the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy", House of Representatives Question No. 166.95
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_shitsumon.htm

Contacts:
Manami Suzuki, Greenpeace Japan, 080-5416-6506 (mobile)
Philip White, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, 81-3-5330-9520

---

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Amari
Foreign Minister Taro Aso

Petition requesting the government to terminate transactions commissioning uranium enrichment to Russia

Despite the fact that no agreement between the Japanese and Russian governments exists for cooperation in the "peaceful use" of nuclear energy covering the transfer of nuclear materials, Japanese electric power companies, beginning with Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), have commissioned uranium enrichment to the Russian enrichment company Techsnabexport (Tenex) and the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry has approved these transactions. As explained below, this is unacceptable.

The Japanese governments' Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy states, "non-proliferation and the system for it are the major premises of peaceful use of nuclear energy". Bilateral agreements, along with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, ensure the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

Bilateral agreements determine specific conditions in relation to the transfer of nuclear materials between the two parties, or to third countries, including acceptance of IAEA safeguards, restriction to peaceful non-explosive uses, penalties, etc.. In order to ensure Japan's "peaceful use" of nuclear energy, and to prevent the military use of nuclear materials transferred to other countries, bilateral agreements should be a precondition for approval of any transaction involving the transfer of nuclear materials.

In particular, since Russia is a nuclear weapons state, as defined in the NPT, it is not obliged to accept IAEA safeguards, and at this point in time it does not accept such safeguards. The distinction between military and civilian facilities in Russia is vague, so there is a danger that nuclear materials transferred from Japan to Russia could be used in nuclear weapons. It is therefore essential that a nuclear cooperation agreement between Japan and Russia be in force before any transactions involving nuclear materials take place.

In order to ensure "peaceful use" and to prevent nuclear proliferation, we therefore request that the Japanese government:
1. take measures to terminate all transactions between Japanese and Russian companies which involve the transfer of nuclear materials, such as uranium enrichment, until a nuclear cooperation agreement covering the transfer of nuclear materials has been concluded and has come into force between Japan and Russia; and
2. not approve any transactions between Japanese companies and companies of countries for which "peaceful use" is not assured under a bilateral agreement.

Greenpeace Japan
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
9 April 2007

See also press release opposing plans for Russia to re-enrich uranium extracted from reprocessed Japanese spent fuel.

Return to CNIC News Service