There has been a series of problems since active tests commenced at Rokkasho reprocessing plant on 31 March 2006. However the owner, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL), has deliberately released only vague details of these problems. Now Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) has received information from a whistleblower (extract below) which shows that these problems are much more serious than JNFL has admitted.
Today CNIC submitted the following letter to JNFL, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Governor of Aomori Prefecture demanding that they publish full details of the circumstances and the responses taken to these incidents.
CNIC Co-Director, Hideyuki Ban, said, "CNIC demands a thorough investigation and full public disclosure of the facts."
Contacts:
Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director) 81-3-5330-9520
Philip White (International Liaison Officer) 81-3-5330-9520
Update: JNFL published a refutation of the whistleblower's accusations on its web site on 16 June 2006. It is clear from JNFL's refutation that the whistleblower did indeed have insider knowledge of the circumstances. We leave it to JNFL to translate its refutation into English.
Mr Isami Kojima, President, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Mr. Kenkichi Hirose, Director-General, Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency
Mr. Shingo Mimura, Governor of Aomori Prefecture
6 June 2006
Yesterday (5 June 2006) Citizens' Nuclear Information Center received an email message concerning two incidents at Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s (JNFL) Rokkasho reprocessing plant (see attached extract). The incidents were a leak of uranous nitrate from a T-joint in the Purification Building on May 17th and the exposure of a worker to plutonium announced by JNFL on May 25th.
The message makes claims about both incidents which are at variance with the information provided so far by JNFL to the media and with the information gathered by CNIC through our direct inquiries to JNFL and Aomori Prefecture.
For example, JNFL stated that 7 liters leaked from the T-joint, but the message claims that 10 times this amount leaked out, overflowing the drains. It claims that the response to the leak differed from JNFL's public statements and that JNFL is concealing these details. The message also claims that there have been a few other cases of radioactive contamination for which no cause has been identified. It adds that even though workers requested that the wearing of masks be required, JNFL did not accept their request.
The information provided on JNFL's home page about the nature and cause of accidents and the response taken is very limited, so the details are still not clear. Furthermore, JNFL has not responded adequately to inquiries by CNIC and other citizens' groups. We have been seeking details in regard to several of the points raised in the message, but have not yet received answers.
We believe the contents of the message to be credible, in that they were provided by someone in a position to know the circumstances of these incidents. We have published the message and demand that JNFL, the Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency and Aomori Prefecture publish full details of the circumstances and the responses taken to these incidents, including the points raised in the message.
Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Subject: Concerning the Truth about Troubles at JNFL
This is a sudden message, but I am very angry about the fact that JNFL published false information about incidents that have occurred recently. Therefore, I am writing this report.
1. Uranium Nitrate leak from a T-joint in the Purification Building
JNFL publicly stated that the amount leaked was 7 liters, but actually 10 times this amount leaked out, overflowing the drains. If this had been publicly admitted, it would have been Class A information, so the figures released were for the situation after the contamination had been removed. Furthermore, although it was said that the T-joint had been dealt with, in fact it had only been repaired with plastic in a very crude fashion. The amount of fluid collected in the repaired area was about 7 liters.
The manufacturer (Toshiba) had envisaged that the T-joints could leak, but JNFL did not allow it to deal with the problem.
It is very strange that this problem was discovered when a worker in a neighboring room noticed a strange smell. The ventilation is not working properly. If the low pressure had been maintained, a worker in a neighboring room would not have noticed the smell, especially not if the quantity was only 7 liters.
2. Concerning the internal exposure to plutonium of a worker in the Analysis Laboratory Building
Contamination had been confirmed on a few occasions before the contamination was discovered on this worker's clothes, but these cases were reported. Indeed, the causes have not been identified. All of these cases were confirmed since the active tests began.
Regarding the fact that it was not a requirement to wear half-face masks for work carried out under the hood [ventilation hood], the same was the case for glove boxes (wearing masks was specified in the manual in some cases). Some workers urged JNFL to require that masks be worn, but this was not included in the manual and the wearing of masks was overlooked.
Furthermore, the person in charge of the section responsible for control of radiation, who was seconded from Japan Atomic Energy Agency, didn't reflect the safety procedures of the prior facility [translators remark: presumably Tokai reprocessing plant, now operated by JAEA]. The exposed worker worked without a break on the day in question.
The work system is unnatural. JNFL did not disclose that the accident was caused by the fact that workers at this subcontractor are forced to work in 4 teams over 3 shifts, whereas JNFL operates 5 teams over 3 shifts. Rather, JNFL emphasized that the problem was caused by human error.
The author of this report requests anonymity.
Click here for more information about active testing of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
Click here for general information about Rokkasho and Japan's nuclear fuel cycle policy.
