On 5 January IAEA Director Mahomed ElBaradei, proposed a five-year moratorium on constructing uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing facilities. He envisages this freeze as being "until we have completed our work on how we can have an international arrangement for the fuel cycle." His proposal follows a similar proposal by Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2 December 2004). The principal difference between the proposals is that the latter didn’t specify a time frame.
Both proposals represent a recognition a recognition of the inherent proliferation risk associated with the nuclear fuel cycle. The proposal to internationalize uranium enrichment and reprocessing is no doubt strongly influenced by a belief that governments would not agree to a moratorium without the prospect of an alternative supply of uranium enrichment and reprocessing services. It also flows from IAEA's mandate to promote the 'peaceful use' of nuclear energy. However, it is highly debatable whether this is a valid approach. The 22 February report of the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (commissioned by ElBaradei) is very vague about whether multilateral approaches would actually reduce proliferation risks, acknowledging proliferation risks for all of the options that it canvasses.
The proposal for a moratorium and for internationalization of the fuel cycle come in the lead up to the NPT Review Conference to be held in May. There is a sense of crisis surrounding the NPT. ElBaradei is to be commended for trying to inject a new sense of urgency into the negotiations. However the internationalization idea, born as it is of a belief in the legitimacy of the 'peaceful use' of nuclear energy, is likely to create more problems that it solves. As it is, it seems that the moratorium idea will be dead on arrival at the NPT. Several key countries have already expressed their opposition to the moratorium proposal. Their objections relate to the view that it would infringe on their "inalienable right to...develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes"(NPT Clause IV). Whether this clause gives parties to the NPT an inalienable right to have uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is debatable, but it is difficult to tell some countries that they can't interpret it in this way, when other countries have been allowed to do so.
This brings us to the question of Japan’s response. Japan has notified the IAEA of its opposition to the moratorium. Media reports indicate that Japan is afraid that it may have to suspend operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant if the freeze takes effect. Apparently ElBaradei has suggested that Japan and some other developed nations may effectively be exempted from the measure, saying it would be introduced on a voluntary basis. This would defeat the purpose of the moratorium, since only countries with no interest in developing fuel cycle facilities would participate. Japan might become more receptive to the idea if it were told that it would become a nuclear fuel cycle center for North Asia, but even when Rokkasho is operational Japan will still be unable to cope with the spent fuel generated by its own nuclear power plants, and it is not even able to supply one third of its own uranium enrichment requirements.
Japan is already capable of producing nuclear weapons at relatively short notice. Rokkasho adds to this capability and also sets a bad example to other would be proliferators. It creates another level of discrimination in the NPT framework. The NPT already discriminates between nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states. Now there will also be discrimination among the non nuclear weapon states. Such a regime is bound to create resentment and fuel desires to acquire nuclear weapons.
If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant ever becomes operational, it will set a bad precedent as the only large scale reprocessing plant outside of the nuclear weapons states. On the other hand, if Japan heeds the calls for a moratorium on new enrichment and reprocessing plants, this would send a very good signal to other states that are thinking of developing such facilities. Japan could do the world a great service by announcing at the NPT Review Conference in May that it is suspending developments at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. This could be just the impetus that the non-proliferation regime needs.
CNIC hopes that Rokkasho will not escape attention at the NPT Review Conference in May. We are aware that a seminar is being planned and that people from both Japanese and non-Japanese NGOs will attend. We are also aware that the Japanese government is very sensitive about this issue. We sincerely hope that this seminar will be a great embarrassment to them.
